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Migrant workers in  the EEC 
There are  five  million migrant workers in the EEC:  those from  the EEC member 
countries  who  benefit  from  the  special  provisions  in  the  Treaty  of  Rome  which 
encourage  mobility  of labour  within  the  EEC  itself  and  those  who  come  from  less 
developed countries outside the Community and do  not enjoy the  same social security 
and other provisions. 
It is  well  known that there are over two  and a  half 
million immigrants in Britain (over one million of them 
from  the  Commonwealth),  but  in  fact  the  influx  of 
people  from  the  less  developed  areas  of  the  world 
affects the whole of Western Europe.  Altogether there 
are between eight and nine million immigrants.  Swit-
zerland  has  one million  and Sweden  171,000,  but the 
majority-nearly five million-are in the EEC countries. 
Table  1 
Immigrants in the  EEC  countries  (in  thousands) 
I 
1968  I  1968  I  1967 
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France  Germany  Netherlands  L~~~~-
Country  of ortgzn 
EEC countries 
Italy  586  454  8.5  11.7 
Other EEC  128  149  12.4  13.0 
Non-EEC  countries 
Spain  618  175  12.6 
Portugal  303  27 
Greece  212  1.6 
Yugoslavia  48  169 
Turkey  8  205  10.3 
Algeria  471 
Morocco  88 
Tunisia  60 
Others  354  533  26.6  3.2  ------
Total  immigrants  2,664  1,924  72.0  27.9 
Total  population  49,866  59,879  12,597  335 
Notes 
No  figures  on  the  nationalities  of  immigrants  in  Belgium  are 
available,  but there  are about 200,000  foreign  workers.  The figures  for 
the  Netherlands  and  Luxembourg  are  for  workers  only,  as  none  on 
the number of immigrants including  dependents are available. 
Sources 
Immigrants:  France, 1968  Census; Germany, Wirtschaft und Statistik, 
No.  7,  1969;  Netherlands  and  Luxembourg,  Kommission  der  Euro-
piiischen  Gemeinschaften,  Die  Freizugigkeit  der  Arbeitskriifte  in  der 
EWG, 1968.  Total population: OECD Observer,  February 1969. 
There are two main groups of migrants:  firstly those 
from  other highly  developed  countries  (usually  within 
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the  Community)  who  move  in  search  of a  better  job 
and  new  experience;  secondly  those  from  countries 
outside  the  Community-Southern  Europe,  North 
Africa  and  even  further  afield-who  leave  their  own 
countries  to  escape  unemployment  and  poverty.  In 
many ways, workers who come from Southern Italy are 
more  like  the  second  group  than  the  first.  As  the 
figures  indicate  the  group  of  people  from  backward 
regions  with  poor  educational  standards  and  little 
industry is by far the largest. 
Some  immigrants  come  to  Community  countries 
permanently.  Others come for a few years only, in the 
hope of saving enough money to go  home and build a 
better life there.  There are important differences in the 
cultural backgrounds of the various immigrant national-
ities.  On the one hand are the Italians and Spaniards 
whose cultures and languages are not very distant from 
those  of France;  on the  other  the  Turks  and  North 
Africans  whose  languages  are  quite  unlike  those  of 
Western  Europe  and  who  have  been  brought  up  in 
Muslim  societies.  An  intermediate  position  is  taken 
up by people  coming  from  the  most  backward  parts 
of Europe, like Portugal and Greece. 
But once these different groups arrive, their aim is  a 
common one:  they hope to  gain prosperity for  them-
selves  and  their  families  by  working  in  the  highly 
developed  industries  of  Western  Europe.  In  recent 
years,  the economic,  social  and cultural integration  of 
immigrants  has  become  an  important  problem  for 
several  Community  countries  as  well  as  for  the 
governing bodies  of the  Community itself. 
Economic importance 
Foreign  workers  make  a  vital  contribution  to  the 
labour  force  in  all  the  Community  countries  except 
Italy  (which  is  still  a  major source  of emigrants)  and 
the Netherlands (where foreigners were only 2.1  per cent of all employees in 1966).  The map shows the national-
.  ities of the foreign workers and the countries in which 
they  are  concentrated.  In  Germany,  the  number  of 
foreign workers  has increased sharply in the  last year 
and there are now nearly 1 t million-over six per cent 
of all  employes.  In France, the  1968  census  counted 
over 1 t  million economically active foreigners  (6.3  per 
cent  of  the  active  population).  Belgium  has  about 
200,000 foreign workers-7 per cent of her labour force. 
More  than  a  quarter  of  Luxembourg's  labour  force 
consists  of foreigners-mainly Italians in  the steel and 
building industries. 
The economic importance of foreign workers lies not 
just  in  their  numbers,  but  in  the  fact  that  they  are 
willing to take jobs which nationals of the host countries 
reject because  the  wages  are poor,  the  working condi-
tions unpleasant or the social status low.  Immigrants, 
usually  hampered  by  ignorance  of the  language,  poor 
basic  education  and lack  of vocational  training,  enter 
the  occupational hierarchy  at the  bottom.  Their  pre-
sence  helps  to  make  it possible  for  nationals  of  the 
host countries to leave the less desirable jobs and move 
up into skilled,  supervisory  and white-collar  positions. 
Thus immigration is a factor assisting the social promo-
tion of the national population. 
Foreign workers are concentrated in occupations like 
building, heavy engineering and metallurgy, mining (in 
France  and  Belgium),  public  services  and  transport, 
catering  and  domestic  services.  For  example,  36  per 
cent of foreign men in France are in the building trades. 
29 per cent of employed foreign women are in domestic 
service.  In Germany a third of the foreign workers are 
in  the  metal industry.  The next largest  quotas  are  in 
other  manufacturing  industries  and  in  building. 
Throughout  the  Community,  most  foreign  employees 
are unskilled or semi-skilled manual workers.  As  they 
are concentrated in certain industries  and regions,  they 
have  become  indispensable  for  the  economies  of  the 
countries in which they work, and their sudden removal 
would lead to economic chaos. 
Immigrants from within 
the EEC 
Community policy 
The free movement of labour within the Community 
was  a  basic part of the  plan for European integration 
laid down in the Rome Treaty (Article 49).  It  has been 
achieved in three stages,  concluding with the  adoption 
of Regulation No. 1612/68  by the Council of Ministers 
on  July  29,  1968-18  months  ahead  of  the  original 
schedule.  Citizens  of  EEC  member  states  have  the 
right to  take up employment in any member state and 
may even go there for up to three months to seek work. 
Member  states  may  no  longer  discriminate  against 
citizens  of other Community countries by giving  their 
own  nationals  priority  in  employment  or  placement 
through the  labour exchanges.  Furthermore,  all  EEC 
citizens enjoy "Community priority" over the nationals 
of outside countries.  A Community worker no longer 
needs  a  work  permit,  but  still  requires  a  residence 
permit, which is  issued for five  years  and is  automati-
cally renewable.  This may be refused only for "reasons 
of public order, safety or health". 
Community  workers  now  enjoy  equal  treatment  in 
virtually  all  matters  relating  to  employment.  This 
includes  taxation,  social security,  the  right  to  bring in 
family  members,  the  right  to  own  a  house,  access  to 
public housing,  and the right to  be  elected to workers' 
representative bodies at the place of work.  Only a few 
restrictions  still  exist:  Community  workers  can  only 
bring their  families  if they  provide evidence  that they 
have an adequate dwelling,  which can be very difficult 
in some  countries;  they  do  not have  full  civic  rights, 
like  the  right  to  vote,  in other  Community  countries; 
they cannot be elected to public office, which in France 
includes the post of trade union official. 
Freedom of movement for workers within the Six has 
become  a  reality,  yet,  at  the  same  time,  the  actual 
number of workers taking advantage of the opportunity 
has  not  increased.  Indeed,  migration  between  the 
Community countries  has  actually  declined.  In  1961, 
292,494  first  work  permits  were  issued  to  citizens  of 
member states moving within the Community.  In 1967 
the figure was only 129,138.  Even if we discount 1967, 
which was  a  recession year in some Community coun-
tries,  and  take  the  1966  figure  we  still  find  a  slight 
decline-only  260,619  workers  moved  within  the 
Community. 
This apparently paradoxical situation is  explained by 
the  development  of  the  Italian  economy,  partly  as  a 
result of the  new  opportunities presented by the EEC. 
About  four-fifths  of  migrants  within  the  EEC  have 
always  come  from  Italy,  but  now  the  large  reserves 
of unemployment  which  existed  there  only  ten  years 
ago  have  been  largely  absorbed  by  rapid  industrial 
development.  Northern  Italy  is  even  beginning  to 
experience  labour  shortages  and  some  Italian  firms 
(Alfa-Romeo  for  instance)  have  sent  recruiting  teams 
to Germany to persuade their compatriots to return to 
highly-paid jobs in Milan or Turin. 
The  pool  of  unemployed  which  still  remains  in 
Southern Italy is  no longer a  source of labour for the 
rest of the Community since,  for reasons of their  age, 
background,  and so  on,  many of these  people are not 
readily adaptable.  The solution to their problem must 
lie  in social and regional development policies  and not 
in emigration. 
The legal barriers to migration within the Community 
may have disappeared, but social, linguistic and cultural 
barriers  still  exist.  As  wages  and  conditions  in  the 
Community countries level  off,  the economic incentive 
to  surmount such barriers declines.  The main type  of 
labour  movement  which  is  now  developing  between 
Community  countries  is  no  longer  a  south  to  north 
migration  of impoverished,  unskilled  men.  It is  that 
of highly-skilled technicians and experts, whose services 
are  required  throughout  the  Community.  Such  em-ployees tend to take their families with them and adapt 
easily  to  their  new  surroundings,  so  that  temporary 
migration no longer means involuntary separation and 
hardship. 
Workers from  outside 
Apart from the temporary economic setback of 1966-
1967, the demand for unskilled and semi-skilled workers 
has continued to  grow.  Due to losses  in both World 
Wars and low birth-rates in the Thirties,  all the Com-
munity countries have populations with increasing pro-
portions of old people, dependent on a relatively static 
labour  force.  Thus  the  additional  workers  needed 
cannot come  from  within  these  countries.  Moreover, 
Community  nationals  who  have  been  able  to  benefit 
from  vocational  training  and  promotion  opportunities 
are less  and less  willing  to take dirty arduous manual 
jobs.  A  situation  of  international  competition  for 
scarce labour has developed, and employers and labour 
ministries have had to  look further  and further  afield 
for new workers. 
At the end of June 1968 only 363,461  of the 1,014,774 
foreign employees in Germany came from other Com-
munity  countries.  Germany  has  labour  recruitment 
agreements  with  Spain,  Greece,  Turkey,  Portugal, 
Yugoslavia,  Morocco,  Tunisia  and  even  South  Korea 
(for nurses  and miners).  At present,  the largest flows 
of foreign workers come from Turkey and Yugoslavia. 
France gets  most her foreign workers from outside the 
Community  as  well-from Spain,  Portugal  and  other 
Southern  European  countries.  In  addition  there  are 
334,000  North African  workers  (plus  285,000  depend-
ents)-mainly  Algerians-and  fifty  thousand  workers 
from  France's  former  colonies  south  of  the  Sahara. 
Holland and Belgium are also having to attract workers 
from Turkey and North Africa.  Only Luxembourg still 
gets  most  of her labour from  within  the  Community. 
No common policy 
The  Community  has  no  common  policy  towards 
immigrants from non-member countries, and the regula-
tions  and  practices  governing  the  workers'  legal,  eco-
nomic and social position vary widely.  Migrants from 
outside  the  Community  are  usually  at  a  considerable 
disadvantage compared with Community citizens.  Their 
freedom to change jobs is  restricted, for some years  at 
least, and this helps to ensure that they do not compete 
for  the  more  desirable  jobs.  They  are  usually  only 
allowed to bring in their families after a year or more. 
Their  political  and  trade  union  rights  are  severely 
limited. 
Although some  EEC countries  have  bilateral agree-
ments  with non-Community countries about the social 
security  of  immigrants,  immigrants  from  outside  the 
Community  do  not  always  have  equality  with  regard 
to  social  security.  If a  Community  national  has  an 
accident or loses  his  job,  he  is  entitled  to  social  insu-
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ranee  benefits  in his  home  country,  but such  benefits 
are not generally transferred abroad in the case of non-
Community  citizens.  Such  workers  are  also  often 
worse off with regard to family allowances-an impor-
tant  factor  in  countries  like  France,  where  family 
allowances  may  form  a  very  high  proportion  of  a 
family's income. 
Illegal immigration 
Many  problems  arise  from  the  spontaneous  nature 
of the  migratory  movements.  Both  France and  Ger-
many  have  recruitment  offices  abroad  which  select 
workers, tell them about the working and living condi-
tions  to  be  expected,  and  provide  transport.  Men 
recruited  in  this  way  find  work and housing  awaiting 
them.  But  an increasing  proportion of the  migration 
does  not  go  through  the  official  systems.  In  1968, 
82  per  cent  of  immigrants  to  France  came  "clan-
destinely", i.e.  without work permits,  or often without 
passports  or  any  papers  at all.  This  is  because  the 
official system is slow and inefficient.  Many Portuguese 
workers  come  illegally  in  order  to  escape  military 
service,  which lasts  3-6  years and usually means being 
sent to fight in Angola or Mozambique. 
The  clandestine  immigrants  arrive  in  a  completely 
new  and strange  society,  with  no idea of how to  find 
work or accommodation.  Such men are easily exploited 
and have no chance of help from the law or the unions 
as  they are illegal immigrants:  taxi-drivers  overcharge 
them,  "agents" take  large  sums  of money  for  finding 
them  work and getting  documents.  Many employers 
(particularly  in  small  building  firms)  take  them  on 
because their weak position compels them to accept low 
wages. 
Housing problems 
Finding a decent place to live  is  one of the greatest 
difficulties for immigrants.  Because they come in search 
of work they  are concentrated in expanding industrial 
areas  where  the  housing  shortage  is  already  severe. 
The host population fears the competition of immigrants 
and this strengthens prejudice against them.  Discrimi-
nation and low incomes combine to  ensure that immi-
grants  everywhere  have  the  worst  housing  conditions. 
The Governments of the Community countries have 
realised that immigrants have special problems and have 
taken  measures  to  help.  In Germany,  employers  are 
obliged  to  provide  accommodation  for  newly  arrived 
single  workers.  In  France,  a  special  fund  builds 
hostels for foreign workers.  But the provisions are not 
adequate  to  meet  needs.  In  Germany  only  about 
100,000  beds  are  available.  In  France  the  figure  is 
60,000. 
In any case, little help is  available  for workers who 
wish  to  bring in  their  families.  They have  to  find  a 
dwelling on the private market.  All too often they end 
up in inadequately converted basements  or attics.  In 
France, which has the worst housing shortage in Europe 
and where average rents  went  up by  178  per cent be-tween  1958  and  1968,  many  immigrants  cannot  find 
proper  accommodation  at  all.  This  is  why  the 
notorious  "bidonvilles"-unhealthy shanty-towns  made 
of  waste  materials  and  scrapmetal-have  grown  up 
around many French cities. 
Integration in the local community 
Clearly, the immigration of large numbers of people 
with very diverse cultural, educational and social back-
grounds  is  bound  to  lead  to  difficulties  of adaptation 
and integration.  The language barrier is  hard to over-
come, particularly as  many immigrants have had little 
basic  education.  Many immigrants are  actually illite-
rate-it is  estimated  that  one  million  adults,  mainly 
immigrants, cannot read or write in France. 
Workers  who  come  for  a  few  years  only  remain 
isolated  from  the  host  society  and  do  not  learn  the 
language and customs of the country.  Although many 
immigrants are beginning to  settle  down  permanently, 
few come with that intention at the outset.  Until they 
finally  realise that they are there for good, it does  not 
seem worthwhile to go  to evening classes.  Thus many 
immigrants spend years in France or Germany without 
learning more than a few words of the language. 
Most  employers  agree  that  foreign  workers  adapt 
rapidly  to  industrial  work.  They  often  work  many 
hours of overtime, for they have to send money home 
to  dependents  and at the  same  time  make  saving  for 
their own  return home.  Ignorance of industrial work 
practices  sometimes  leads  to  conflicts  between  immi-
grants and other workers, and strikes and disputes often 
arise.  The unions  of the  Community  countries  have 
taken  special  action  to  solve  such  problems.  The 
difficulties are great, but many immigrants have become 
active  trade  unionists,  despite  the  initial  suspicion  of 
other workers. 
Future trends 
If economic growth continues at its present rate, most 
EEC countries are likely to need immigrant labour for 
the  next  few  decades  at least.  It has  been  estimated 
that Germany  will  have  two  million  foreign  workers 
by the mid-Seventies, which means at least three million 
immigrants including dependents.  Migrants within the 
Community enjoy good social conditions and the chance 
of getting any job  they wish.  Migrants  from  outside 
the  Community,  on  the  other  hand,  are  concentrated 
in the worst jobs, and are often kept there by restrictive 
regulations  and  lack  of  training  opportunities.  They 
4 
also suffer poor housing and social conditions.  Already, 
people  are  speaking  of  the  immigrants  as  "Europe's 
new lower class".  Special action is  needed to improve 
their conditions. 
The home countries of the immigrant workers  hope 
that labour migration will help in their economic deve-
lopment.  They  hope  to  get  back  a  core  of  highly-
trained  industrial  workers  and  that  workers'  savings 
will  provide  a  source  of  foreign  currency  for  the 
purchase  of  capital  goods  abroad.  At  present  such 
potential  benefits  are  often  merely  wishful  thinking. 
Most foreign workers from countries outside the Com-
munity do not obtain vocational training which would 
be  useful  to  them  on  their  return  home,  and  their 
savings  are  usually  spent  on  consumer  goods  or  on 
unproductive  small  businesses  in  the  services  sector. 
A  common EEC policy could help both to raise the 
social status of migrants while in the Community coun-
tries  and to  make them  more valuable  to  their  home 
countries when (and if) they return.  The setting up of 
centres  to  give  basic  language  and vocational training 
to  prospective  migrants  before  departure  would  aid 
the  speedy  integration  of foreign  workers  and  would 
make  it easier for them  to  learn  a  useful  trade while 
abroad.  In the past such centres have  been set up in 
Italy with the assistance of the European Social Fund. 
Now  that  most  immigrants  come  from  outside  the 
Community there is  a  good case for extending similar 
schemes to other countries. 
Further Community policies could ensure that foreign 
workers get the jobs  they are best suited for, and that 
they  are  given  chances  of  promotion.  Reasonable 
housing  conditions  could  also  be  provided  for.  The 
creation  of  a  better-trained  and  more  stable  foreign 
labour force would, in the long run, be to the advantage 
both  of  the  Community  and  of  the  foreign  workers' 
home countries.  The emergence of a  new lower class 
of immigrants can only be prevented by the recognition 
of  the  international  unification  of the  labour  market 
which is  already coming about, and the granting of full 
social and political rights to immigrants, wherever they 
come from. 
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Comecon 
The Council for  Mutual Economic Assistance was given fresh  impetus by the 
challenge  of  integration  in  Western  Europe.  Eastern  European  cooperation  is 
compared  with  integration  in  Western  Europe.  Finally  there  is  the  question  of 
how to reform Comecon to align it with the present movement of economic reform 
in Eastern Europe. 
The origins 
The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance,  known  as 
"CMEA" or, more commonly, "Comecon", was  founded in 
January  1949  by  the  USSR,  Bulgaria,  Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary,  Poland  and  Rumania.  Albania  joined  in  April 
1949  and East Germany in September  1950.  In May 1956 
Communist  China  and  Yugoslavia  became  "observers", 
North Korea and North Vietnam following  them in  1957. 
Yugoslavia withdrew in 1958  and did not renew its associa-
tion  as  an observer until  1964.  China,  North Korea  and 
North  Vietnam  gradually  withdrew  after  1960  when  the 
Sino-Soviet  dispute  came  into  the  open.  Albania,  which 
supported the Chinese in the quarrel, withdrew abruptly in 
1961.  In 1962  Outer  Mongolia was  admitted  to,  and  still 
retains, full membership. 
The purpose  of Comecon as  defined  in  Article I  of  the 
Statutes  adopted  in  1960  is  "by uniting  and co-ordinating 
the  efforts  of the member countries" to promote the deve-
lopment of the  national  economy  and  the  acceleration  of 
economic and technical progress in the member states;  the 
acceleration  of  industrialization  in  the  less  developed 
member  states,  an  increase  in  the  productivity  of labour 
and an improvement in  the  welfare  of the  peoples  of the 
member  states.  The  Article  goes  on  to  say  that  "the 
Council for  Mutual Economic Assistance is  established  on 
the  basis  of  the  sovereign  equality  of  all  the  member 
countries of the Council". 
Comparison with the EEC 
Although the general aim of promoting economic welfare 
as set out in the Comecon Statutes is  similar to that of the 
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EEC as set out in the Treaty of Rome (defined in Article 2 
of the  Treaty as  being  "to promote  throughout the  Com-
munity a harmonious development of economic activities, a 
continuous  and balanced  expansion,  an increased  stability, 
an accelerated  raising  of the  standard  of living  and close 
relations between its member states") there is  an important 
difference  between  the  method  proposed  to  achieve  the 
desired  end.  Whereas  the  Treaty  of  Rome  provides  for 
the  gradual  establishment  of  a  Common  Market  within 
which  common  policies  will  be  accepted  by  the  member 
states and many of the functions  of economic management 
progressively  assigned  to common institutions,  the Statutes 
of Comecon  go no further  than  to authorize  the  Council 
to organize cooperation between  the member states  and to 
recommend  joint  measures  in  specified  fields  of  activity. 
This  is  essentially  a  difference  between  integration  and 
co-operation. 
It may appear paradoxical that the "authoritarian" states 
of Eastern  Europe  should  adopt a  system  so  much  more 
"permissive" than that adopted by the six  democratic West 
European States, but the Statutes  of Comecon assume  that 
the  member  states,  under  the  rule  of  Communist Parties, 
are already in effect politically integrated and that for this 
reason they will find  no difficulty in voluntary cooperation 
in  economic and technical matters.  This assumption is  in 
fact  too optimistic;  the institutional structure  of Comecon 
is not strong enough to implement proposals for integration 
or  even  for  cooperation  against  the  will  of  the  member 
states.  The Council,  the  supreme  directing  body,  is  com-
posed  of comparatively  junior ministers  from  the member 
states;  when major policy decisions are to be taken special 
meetings  of  senior  government  and  party  officials,  not 
forming part of the Comecon organization itself, have to be 
arranged.  The Council of Comecon has neither the status 
nor  the  powers  of the  Council  of Ministers  of the  EEC. The institutions 
The headquarters office  of Comecon is  in Moscow.  The 
Council 1,  composed of Vice-Premiers, Ministers of Foreign 
Trade  Chairmen  of  State  Planning  Commissions  of  the 
member states  or persons  of comparable rank, is  required 
to meet at least once a  year in each of the  capitals  of the 
member  states  in  rotation.  Since  1962  there  has  been  an 
Executive  Committee  to  maintain  the  direction  of  the 
organization's  work  between  meetings  of  the  Council.  A 
permanent Secretary,  N.  Fadeev  of the  USSR,  controls  a 
staff of experts and advisers drawn from the member states. 
In  1956  permanent Commissions,  specializing  in particular 
sectors  of  the  economy,  were  established  in  the  member 
states,  located  in countries  where  interest  in  the  sector  in 
question  is  particularly  strong  (e.g.  agriculture  in  Sofia, 
chemicals in East Berlin, coal in Warsaw, machine-building 
in Prague).  The Commissions which deal with major ques-
tions  of common concern-electrical energy,  foreign  trade, 
economic  problems,  uses  of  atomic  energy,  co-ordination 
of research, statistics and foreign exchange-are in Moscow. 
For so large  an area  the  permanent staff  is  comparatively 
small,  perhaps  no  more  than  a  third  of  the  number 
employed  by  the  EEC  in  Brussels.  The  layout  of  the 
organization  tends  to  emphasize  the  presence  of  the  one 
very large Power in its midst, for while the headquarters of 
the  EEC  is  in  Belgium,  one  of  the  smaller  of  the  EEC 
states, the headquarters of Comecon and an important part 
of its institutions are in the USSR. 
The powers  of the  central institutions  of Comecon  over 
the member states are limited not only by  the composition 
of the Council but also by Article IV of the Statutes which 
lays  down  that  (a)  the  recommendations  adopted  by  the 
member countries  of the Council shall  be  implemented by 
the governments in accordance with national legislation and 
(b)  the effects  of recommendations  and decisions  shall  not 
extend  to  countries  which  have  declared  their  lack  of 
interest in a matter considered by the Council.  The weak-
ness  of  the  Council's  authority  has  had  contrary  effects. 
In  the  first  place  although  no  single  country  can  exercize 
a  veto  in the  Council, it can prevent any recommendation 
from  being  uniformly  applied  throughout  the  area. 
Secondly,  the single most powerful member of the Council 
cannot  "constitutionally"  use  the  Council  to  impose  a 
decision  on  another  member.  Thirdly,  it  is  extremely 
difficult  for  those  in  Eastern  Europe who  wish  to see  the 
area  more  closely  integrated  (as  distinct  from  more  co-
operative)  to  use  the  machinery  of  the  Council  for  this 
purpose. 
Development 
1945-1956 
In  the  period  from  1945  to  1949  when  the  USSR  was 
establishing  the  regimes  in  Eastern  Europe  which  gave  it 
effective  political  and  military  control  of  the  area  there 
was  no  plan  to  integrate  their  economies  on  the  lines 
adopted  by  the  EEC.  In many  ways  Eastern  Europe was 
cut off  from the rest  of the  world  and developed  methods 
in  economic  planning  and  foreign  trade  which  gave  it a 
1  See insert. 
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unique and exclusive  character of its  own.  As  a  result of 
this  isolation  it was  natural  that the  countries  of Eastern 
Europe should trade with each other much more than with 
the  outside  world.  On the  other hand each country  tried 
to  reconstruct  its  economy  and  to  hasten  the  process  of 
industrialization in accordance with its  own national plans, 
and this led to a  high degree  of national self-sufficiency or 
autarky. 
In  the  first  period  of  Comecon's  existence,  which 
coincided  with  the  last years  of Stalin's life,  the  organiza-
tion, smaller and weaker than it is  today, could do virtually 
nothing  to  influence  economic  developments  in  Eastern 
Europe except to try to co-ordinate the lists of commodities 
to be exchanged between the member states.  Apart from a 
meeting in Sofia in November 1950 to discuss inter-regional 
trade  no  meeting  of  the  Council  took  place  between  the 
end  of  1949  and  the  spring  of  1954.  Not  only  was  no 
progress  made in  regional  planning in  this  period:  under 
pressure from the USSR the economies of the states became 
even more distorted by the priority given to heavy industry. 
With  the death  of Stalin  and the  ending of the  Korean 
War  in  1953  there  was  a  widespread  reaction  in  Eastern 
Europe  against  the  hardships  endured  by  the  ordinary 
consumer.  A  new  phase  began.  Now  for  the  first  time 
consideration  could  be  given  to  the  supply  of  consumer 
goods  and  the  rationalization  of production  in  order  to 
reduce  costs.  The  Council  of  Comecon  awoke  from  its 
long  sleep  and  began  to  meet more  frequently,  discussing 
the  construction  of a  unified  electricity  grid,  encouraging 
the member states  to conclude  long-term trade  agreements 
with each other and beginning to get to grips with the idea, 
which  was  to  prove very  troublesome  later  on,  that there 
should  be  specialization  in  production  as  between  the 
member states. 
1956-1962 
In  1956,  undoubtedly  spurred  on  by  the  progress  of 
negotiations  for  economic  integration  in  Western  Europe 
the  institutional structure of Comecon was  at last strength-
ened  and  the  first  twelve  standing  commissions  were 
established.  Serious  discussion  of  the  plan  to  specialize 
production by country did not begin until 1957-1958.  Here 
the Council met with disappointment because many  of the 
states  were  reluctant to agree  to  specialization  as  it might 
involve  the  dis-continuance  of  industrial  activities  in  a 
particular  member  state  and  their  transfer  elsewhere.  In 
fact very little was  achieved.  Dissatisfied with progress the 
Party  leaders  of  the  member  states  met  in  Moscow  in 
May  1958  and  agreed  that  the  economies  of the  member 
states  should  be  reorganized  and  their  national  plans  co-
ordinated.  The  most  important  practical  effect  of  the 
meeting  was  not so  much  a  fundamental  change in  orga-
nization as a  major investment boom which affected all the 
member  states  but  left  relations  between  them  largely 
unchanged.  It did not secure closer integration. 
Challenged by the rapid progress of the EEC in its early 
years  the  Party  leaders  of  the  Comecon  states  subjected 
their  own  system,  which  was  evincing  all  the  signs  of 
stagnation,  to  a  searching  analysis  in  1962.  This  time 
Mr.  Krushchev  put forward  an ill-prepared  scheme  for  a 
central planning institution for the whole of Comecon which 
would in effect have imposed the long-sought-for specializa-
tion  among  the  member  states  by  authoritarian  direction. 
To achieve  such  a  centralized  system  it would  have  been 
necessary to alter the Statutes and give  the  organization an 
entirely  new  status.  In fact  discussion  did  not reach  that 
stage  for the  Rumanians,  fearing  with  considerable  justice ~  COMECON TRADE  WITH  EEC,  UK AND  USA* 
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*in$ m that the scheme would halt their own industrialization and 
condemn  them  to supplying  food  and raw materials, went 
into  opposition  and  have  ever  since  been  implacable 
opponents of central planning and even of closer integration 
in  the  organization.  Though  less  outspoken  than  the 
Rumanians other Comecon states dislike the idea of central 
planning  for  the  whole  area,  chiefly  on  the  grounds  that 
its  supranational  character  would  imperil  such  national 
independence as  they have been able to preserve within the 
"socialist  commonwealth".  There  are  still  some  Russian 
theorists  and officials  who advocate  a  comprehensive  plan 
in  the  longer  term  but  the  Soviet  Government  has  been 
very  cautious  in  its  official  pronouncements  on  the  issue 
since 1962 and has hesitated to give a strong lead. 
Economic reform in Eastern Europe 
Opinions on the subject of integration have become more 
complex and diverse  since the movement for reform of the 
management of the national economies began to take shape 
in Eastern  Europe  in  the  early sixties.  Beginning  in  East 
Germany in  1963,  extending through Poland and the USSR 
in  1965,  launched  in  Czechoslovakia  in  1966,  cautiously 
applied  in  Rumania  in  1967  and  culminating  in  its  most 
advanced exemplar in Hungary in 1968 the movement seeks 
to  resolve  the  difficulties  of central  planning  in  what  are 
now  industrial  societies  by  a  limited  decentralization  of 
economic  decision-making.  While  all  the  states  retain  the 
concept  of the central national plan they  all  now  devolve, 
in varying degrees,  some  of the responsibility for decision-
making  to  industrial  associations  and  enterprises  and  all 
accept, in varying degrees, the management of the economy 
by such means as the control of credit as a partial substitute 
for the detailed direction of the economy by means of strict 
quantitative  prescription  from  the  central planning  autho-
rities.  In  most  cases,  and  in  varying  degrees,  cautious 
experiments  are  being  made  with  the  use  of  prices  and 
differentials  in earnings  as  a  means  of adjusting supply  to 
demand and stimulating initiative. 
Comecon  as  such  plays  no part in  the  reforms  which, 
although  they  share  a  good  deal  of  common  ground 
throughout  the  area,  are  being  implemented  in  strikingly 
different  ways  as  between  one  country  and  another 
according  to  national  requirements.  Although  restrained 
by the fate  of Czechoslovakia, where economic reform was 
associated with a  political ferment crushed in August  1968 
by  the  USSR  as  an intolerable  deviation  from  the  norm, 
the Comecon states have developed systems  of management 
which  have  heightened  diversity  rather  than  uniformity 
within  the  organization.  The  problem  of integration  has 
become correspondingly more complex. 
Trade 
The member states do a  large part of their foreign trade 
with each other 1.  The levels  of trade are planned by the 
national  states  (with  some  intervention  from  the  central 
Comecon  institutions)  and  incorporated  in  bilateral  trade 
agreements.  Together  with  participation  in  joint  projects 
such as  the electricity grid, some joint production arrange-
ments  between  enterprises  and  the  exchange  of  technical 
information these  agreements are the  principal instruments 
for  the  integration-such  as  it is-of  the  area.  It is  a 
laborious  and  unsatisfactory  method,  widely  criticized  in 
Eastern Europe for its failure  to promote the free flow  of 
1  See  table,  page  4. 
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commodities, capital and labour, its  failure to promote the 
grouping  of enterprises  to obtain  the  advantages  of large 
scale  production  and  therefore  the  progress  of industrial 
efficiency  and  its  failure  to  secure  a  rational  system  of 
prices upon which calculations can be made.  The monetary 
system,  based on artificial exchange rates and a  method of 
accounting in inconvertible roubles carried out through the 
International Bank for Economic Cooperation hampers not 
only  the  development of trade within the  area but also its 
relations with the rest of the world economy 2.  Given this 
legacy  from  the  past  and  the  institutional  weakness  of 
Comecon, the diversity in levels  of economic development, 
the  differences  in  methods  of economic  management,  the 
universal  tendency  towards  greater  decentralization  in  the 
national  economies  and  the  general  desire  of  the  non-
Russian  members  to safeguard a  degree  of national  inde-
pendence,  it  is  small  wonder  that  a  consensus  as  to  the 
replacement of the  present Comecon system  by a  new and 
more closely integrated  one  is  hard to find. 
Comecon future 
Most  members  of  Comecon  accept  the  necessity  for 
reform.  They  see  the  advantages  of  scale  and  technical 
progress which might flow  from a better system of regional 
integration.  But  how  are  they  to  be  obtained?  To 
conceive  of the area as  a  single planned economy is  to go 
back on the principles of the contemporary reforms and to 
invite  political  trouble.  To conceive  of it,  as  some  East 
European thinkers do, as a  potential single market is to go 
beyond  the  scope  of  the  national  reforms  as  at  present 
operating and, by inviting still more radical changes in the 
system  of  economic  management,  challenge  the  basis  of 
socialist  planning  in  the  member  states  themselves.  The 
search for a way of escape from this dilemma is giving rise 
to intense discussion.  The member states tend, on grounds 
of  general  principle  and  of  national  interest,  to  proffer 
divergent  solutions  which  at  one  extreme  favour  the  idea 
of a common market and at the other either the status quo 
or a more closely integrated technological community.  The 
problem  is  so  inherently  difficult  that  the  last  "summit" 
meeting  of  party  and  government  leaders  in  April  1969 
produced almost no result.  The debate will  be protracted; 
decisions  as  and when  they  are  reached  will  be of major 
importance  not only  for  the  future  of Comecon  but also 
for the relationships between its member states and the rest 
of the world. 
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Imports  Exports 
1958 
I 
%  I 
1968 
I 
%  1958 
I 
%  I 
1968 
I 
%  $m  $m  $m  $m 
USSR 
Total  4,350  100  9,410  100  4,298  100  10,634  100 
From/to 
EEC  222  5.1  908  9.6  271  6.3  758  7.1 
UK  73  1.7  273  3.0  146  3.4  367  3.4 
Other  Comecon a  2,206  50.7  5,697  60.0  2,320  54.0  5,830  53.0 
East Germany 
Total  1,680  100  3,387  100  1,890  100  3,783  100 
From/to 
EEC  250  14.9  396  11.7  252  13.3  465  12.3 
(Of which: 
W. Germany)  190  11.3  289  8.6  211  11.2  331  8.8 
UK  33  2.0  38  1.1  12  0.6  31  0.8 
Other  Comecon a  1,055  62.8  2,426  71.5  1,229  65.0  2,708  71.4 
Poland 
Total  1,227  100  2,853  100  1,059  100  2,858  100 
From/to 
EEC  138  11.2  363  12.7  120  11.3  293  10.3 
UK  83  6.8  175  6.1  69  6.5  147  5.1 
Other  Comecon a  651  53.0  1,749  61.1  508  47.9  1,760  61.4 
Czechoslovakia 
Total  1,357  100  3,077  100  1,513  100  3,005  100 
From/to 
122  9.0  289  9.4  EEC  110  7.3  290  9.6 
UK  32  2.4  80  2.6  29  1.9  80  2.7 
Other  Comecon a  844  62.2  2,083  67.5  910  60.2  1,944  64.4 
Hungary 
Total  631  100  1,803  100  684  100  1,789  100 
From/to 
EEC  73  11.6  220  12.2  75  11.0  200  11.2 
UK  20  3.2  52  2.9  12  1.8  42  2.3 
Other  Comecon a  399  63.3  1,189  65.9  388  56.8  1,214  67.5 
Roumania 
Total  482  100  1,609  100  468  100  1,469  100 
From/to 
EEC  51  10.6  423  26.3  56  11.9  255  17.4 
UK  7  1.5  101  6.3  7  1.5  56  3.8 
Other  Comecon a  361  74.8  741  46.0  322  68.8  767  52.1 
Bulgaria 
Total  367  100  1,782  100  373  100  1,615  100 
From/to 
EEC  30  8.1  196  11.0  25  6.7  126  7.8 
UK  3  0.8  21  1.2  3  0.8  27  1.7 
Other  Comecon a  302  82.2  1,301  72.9  306  81.8  1,211  74.9 
Comecon 
Total  10,172  100  23,921  100  10,315  100  25,153  100 
From/to 
EEC  888  8.8  2,794  11.7  910  8.8  2,387  9.5 
UK  252  2.5  739  3.1  277  2.7  749  3.0 
Other  Comecon a  5,891  57.9  15,187  63.5  6,060  57.7  15,433  60.5 
a  Not including Albania, Mongolia. 
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Britain and  Europe since 1945 
Britain's  flirtations  with  Europe  have  been  a  constant  factor  in  European 
politics since  the end of the war.  The past negotiations are  reviewed in  the  per-
spective  of  the  current  debate  about  application  for  entry  into  the  Common 
Market. 
The  question  of  British  entry  into  the  European  Com-
munity dominates  British foreign policy and is  likely to  do 
so  for  some time.  Few leading governmental,  business,  or 
labour  leaders  remain  uncommitted  and  two  polarized 
bodies  of  opinion  now  compete  for  support  from  among 
the broad masse of the  British people. 
In this atmosphere it is  understandable to view Britain as 
an  outsider,  or  non-European,  attempting  to  become  a 
member  of  the  European  club.  Such  a  view,  while 
fashionable,  distorts  or  ignores  much  of  British  foreign 
policy  since  the  Second  World  War.  Britain  was  always, 
in its own frame of reference, European; albeit reluctantly. 
The evolution of Britain's attitude to the EEC had to await 
both the development of a  viable, tangible Europe as  well 
as the decline in her other foci of interests. 
From the war to the ECSC
1 
Reconstruction and cooperation after the War was  facili-
tated  by  the  establishment  of several  European  organiza-
tions  such  as  the  European  Payments  Union,  the  Orga-
nization for European Economic Cooperation (OECD) and 
the Council of Europe.  Under the influence of the British 
these  organizations  were  designed  on  the  basis  of  inter-
governmental  cooperation  and  thus  fell  short of the  aims 
of  continental  federalists  who  thought  that reconstruction 
might  provide  an impetus for  greater European unity. 
In  the  field  of defence,  the  British  like  the  Americans 
tended to regard the increasing differences between East and 
West  as  the greatest  threat to world  order.  This  attitude 
1  See  European Studies, Teachers' Series No.  1 "The European Com-
munities: historical background". 
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was  at  odds  with  that  of  the  Continent  of  Europe  but 
reinforced  the  British  notion  that  a  "special  relationship" 
existed between  Britain and America. 
Without minimizing either the Soviet threat or the extra-
European interests of countries like France, the Netherlands 
and Belgium, the first priority of Western Europe in security 
matters was  to eliminate  the  possibilities  of armed conflict 
between  France  and  Germany.  With  this  aim  in  view 
Robert Schuman, the French foreign minister, proposed the 
idea  of a  Coal  and  Steel  Community.  As  coal  and steel 
were the basis of the armaments industry in Europe, it was 
thought  that  an  agreement  which  made  France  and  Ger-
many  interdependent  in  these  areas  would  prevent  either 
from going to war against the other. 
Belgium,  Holland,  Italy  and  Luxembourg  joined  with 
France and Germany to form the European Coal and Steel 
Community in  1952.  The  United  Kingdom was  asked  to 
participate  but  declined  although  the  Conservative  party 
was  critical of Atlee's action at the time it too declined to 
join when returned to power. 
Joining the ECSC appeared to involve the surrendering of 
more independence than Britain was  prepared to do at that 
time.  The British were aware that the European visionaries 
saw  the  ECSC  as  the  first  step  towards  a  supra-national 
Europe  and  they  believed  that  membership  of  a  supra-
national Europe would limit their freedom of manreuvre in 
other foreign  policy  areas-i.e. in the  Commonwealth  and 
in  playing  a  global  role  in  conjunction  with  the  United 
States. 
If Britain is  to be blamed in these early days it must not 
be for underestimating Europe, but rather for overestimating 
the  value  of  the  Commonwealth  and  Empire  and  the 
advantages  of Britain's relationship with the United States. 
In  1954,  however,  Britain  ratified  an  "Agreement  con-
cerning the relations between the European Coal and Steel 
Community  and  the  United  Kingdom",  which  erected  a Standing  Council  of  Association  with  functions  relating 
exclusively  to  a  "continuous  exchange  of  information", 
"consultation"  and  "coordination  of  action"  in  regard  to 
matters of common interest concerning coal and steel.  This 
agreement still stands and indeed  there is  still a  permanent 
ECSC delegation in London today.  The Manchester Guar-
dian  (December 9,  1954)  called the agreement "perhaps too 
cautious, too typical of reluctant British insularity". 
Messina to EFTA 
At  this  time  the  Six  were  already  preparing  to 
launch,  in  the  form  of  the  Messina  conference  of  June 
1955,  their next and most ambitious scheme  to  date a  plan 
for economic collaboration. 
The Messina conference established a Committee, chaired 
by M. Spaak, to investigate ways in which integration in the 
general field of economics and trade and in the specific area 
of nuclear research could take place.  The United Kingdom 
was invited to participate in these early discussions and did 
so.  This almost immediately led  to differences  of opinion 
about  the  nature  of  any  arrangements.  The  Six  were 
reasonably  happy  with  the  functioning  of the  ECSC  and 
favoured close ties  along those lines.  Their preference was 
for  a  customs  union  and  supra-national  institutions  of 
limited power.  The British, on the other hand, favoured  a 
free  trade area and preferred to work  through  the  OEEC. 
The United .Kingdom withdrew from the talks in December, 
1955  because  British interests could not be  reconciled with 
what the Six had in mind. 
The reasons underlying  Britain's position remain unclear 
but  it  appears  that  the  British  Government  made  some 
serious  miscalculations.  As  was  suggested  earlier,  the 
British appeared to underestimate the determination of the 
Continentals  to  proceed  on  the  path  towards  integration. 
The  Government  also  appears  to  have  overestimated  the 
British  bargaining  position.  The  Six  were  discussing 
two  separate but related issues:  integration in  the  field  of 
atomic  energy  and  the  Common  Market.  Because  of 
British  pre-eminence  in  nuclear  research  the  Government 
seems to have assumed that the Six would make concessions 
over  the  Common  Market  aspects  in  return  for  British 
participation in the atomic energy agreements.  This might 
have  been  so  had  the  United  States  not undermined  the 
British position by insinuating that it was prepared to assist 
any  European  cooperative  effort  in  the  field  of  nuclear 
research.  The  British  also  hoped  to  get  strong  support 
from the United States and from other OEEC members for 
its pro-OEEC, free trade position.  This was likewise eroded 
by  the  Americans  when  they expressed  strong  support for 
the  more  substantive  efforts  proposed  by  the  Spaak Com-
mittee.  Another factor may be that the British simply were 
not prepared for the events  which unfolded in 1955.  The 
speed  with  which  the  Six  moved  was  indeed  surprising 
considering that the EDC disaster had so  closely  preceded 
this new impetus. 
The  British  Government  continued  to  press  for  a  free 
trade  area  within  the  OEEC  but  this  invariably  brought 
them to loggerheads with the Six.  The Europeans felt that, 
in proposing the free  trade area, the British were intent on 
destroying  the  EEC  before  it  could  get  off  the  ground. 
Charges  of  "wrecking"  and  of  "dividing  Europe"  were 
hurled at the Six and especially France and it became clear 
that  the  negotiations  between  Britain  and  the  Six  were 
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continuing  on  little  more  than  their  own  faltering 
momentum. 
By  the time  the negotiations  broke down in  1958  it was 
evident that the Six and the United Kingdom retained most 
of their  fundamental  differences.  The Six  were  intent  on 
building  a  close,  formal,  and  binding  relationship  among 
themselves  and  while  they  were  not  opposed  to  Britain 
joining the Community they were  not prepared to alter its 
fundamental  structure  to  accommodate  her.  Britain,  on 
the other hand, could not enter an agreement which forced 
her  to  fundamentally  restructure  her  traditional  trading 
policy built on Commonwealth preferences and cheap food 
and  raw  materials  in  return  for  benefits  that  appeared 
intangible  and  uncertain.  The  extent  to  which  Britain's 
attitudes towards the future of Europe lagged behind those 
of the continentals  is  illustrated by  the  fact that when,  in 
1956,  Britain  proposed  a  free  trade  area,  an  arrangement 
already considered inadequate  by  the  Six,  it represented  a 
significant  change  in  British  policy  and  provoked  much 
debate in the United Kingdom. 
The Stockholm  Convention  for  a  European Free Trade 
Area  was  signed  by Austria,  Denmark,  Norway, Portugal, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom in 1959. 
The decision to enter the EEC 
The British  Government  took  the  opportunity  provided 
by the signing of "the EFT  A agreement to engage in a major 
reappraisal  of  foreign  policy  and  the  assumptions  upon 
which  it was  based.  It was  obvious  that,  in the  light  of 
changing realities, Churchill's three circles  concept required 
re-examination. 
The  special  relationship  with  the  United  States  was 
certainly in need  of a  fresh  assessment.  Although it was 
not fully  appreciated  at the  time,  Suez  demonstrated  that 
any hope the British had of influencing American policy was 
rapidly diminishing as  the United States acquired independ-
ent interests  of its  own.  Britain's efforts  for free  trade in 
the context of Europe not only failed  to win  favour in the 
United States  but actually  ran counter to .At;nerican  policy 
towards Europe.  Since the early post-war years the Ameri-
cans had often been more "European" than the Europeans 
and  they  enthusiastically  endorsed  the  type  of community 
favoured  by the Six.  With the formation  of the EEC the 
United  States  began  paying  more  attention  directly  to 
Europe, and the  British,  rather than providing the road to 
Europe,  risked  being  bypassed  by  the  Americans  if they 
stayed out. 
The Commonwealth too had changed greatly in the years 
since  the war.  Much of the post-war optimism concerning 
the  political  strength  of  the  Commonwealth  had  faded. 
It was  clear that the  emerging  multiracial Commonwealth 
would  be  quite  different  from  the  small  group  composed 
of  the  old  Dominions  and  Britain.  The  Commonwealth 
and  the  remnants  of  Empire  were  still  highly  valued  in 
Britain but they certainly provided no political or economic 
alternative to Europe. 
Europe was  also  considerably different  from  its  pre-war 
or  early  post-war  equivalent.  European unity  excited  the 
imaginations  of many  on  both  sides  of the  Channel  ann 
after  several  false  starts  it appeared  that  European  unity 
might  at  last  be  safely  launched.  The  Common  Market 
had not been the  economic  disaster  for  Britain  that some 
envisaged  but  as  the  Six  began  increasingly  to  talk  of 
political cooperation the implications could not be ignored in the United Kingdom.  Time had also shown that Britain 
had  little  to  fear  from  the  Community  institutions  since 
de  Gaulle  had  strong  views  on  supranationalism;  views 
which  were  remarkably  close  to  those  of  the  British 
Government. 
These realities were all brought home to the Government 
in its  foreign  policy  reviews  and entry into  Europe began 
to  assume  enticing  characteristics.  There  remained,  how-
ever,  a  number  of very  serious  obstacles.  There  was  the 
problem  of  Britain's  Commonwealth  preferences.  Britain 
could  give  up  its  preferences  in  other  Commonwealth 
markets  easily  enough  but to terminate  free  access  to  the 
British market would impose a hardship on many Common-
wealth producers.  More seriously, entry into Europe would 
amount to reverse discrimination in the sense that Common-
wealth  exports  to Britain  would  not only  lose  their  privi-
leged  position  but, through the  imposition  of the common 
tariff, would be put at a disadvantage vis-a-vis exports from 
the Six.  These were  problems that had always  existed  for 
Britain  but, in addition,  there  was,  since  1959,  a  new  one 
in the  form  of the EFTA.  Britain was  the  primary force 
behind  the  creation  of the  EFT  A  and  she  felt  a  respon-
sibility  to  ensure  that  other  EFT  A  members  would  not 
suffer unduly from  British membership in the EEC. 
This  was  the  quandary  in  which  Britain found  itself  in 
the latter part of 1960.  Prime Minister Macmillan's cabinet 
was  far from unanimous  on the  question  of entry and no 
decision  could  be  taken  until  the  Government  could 
ascertain what concessions the Six might be willing to make. 
The Six took the position that nothing could be done until 
Britain applied for membership.  Mr. Macmillan, the Prime 
Minister,  was  left  with  no  choice  and  finally,  at  great 
political risk, he  announced to the House of Commons  on 
31  July,  1961  that he intended to seek full  membership  of 
the European Communities, making it clear, however,  that 
the  vital  interests  of  the  Commonwealth  and  the  EFT  A 
would have to be considered. 
The first negotiations for membership 1961-1963 
The negotiations started in the autumn of 1961  and were 
terminated  by  President de Gaulle's veto in January  1963. 
The General's  motives  were  political and  few  were  fooled 
when he cited the non-productive character of the  talks  as 
the reason for their cessation. 
The real problems in  the negotiations were the result of 
the  seemingly  impossible  position  that the  British  Govern-
ment was  in.  Governmental  opinion  concerning  the  aims 
and ideals of a European Community was somewhat behind 
that on the continent and this led the Europeans to question 
the  depth  of the  British  conversion.  The issue  was  com-
plicated by the fact that general British opinion on Europe 
was  considerably  behind  that  of  the  Government.  The 
result was that the Government was forced to say one thing 
at home and another on  the continent.  In convincing  the 
Europeans  of  their  sincerity  they  ran  risks  of  offending 
opinion at home.  In attempting to soothe domestic opinion 
the Government raised fresh doubts on the continent.  This 
was  the dilemma which faced  the Government. 
The  views  of the  British  Government  gradually  moved 
closer to those on the continent but, unfortunately, domestic 
views crystallized as the Labour Party hardened its position 
against entry.  These problems further complicated matters 
because  they  affected  the  negotiations.  To  demonstrate 
that  they  were  not  "selling  out"  the  Commonwealth  the 
Government  was  forced  to  take  an  unrealistically  hard 
bargaining  position  with  the  knowledge  that  they  would 
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have  to  make  concessions  later.  The  unrealistic  initial 
position taken  by the  British  disturbed  the Europeans and 
raised  doubts about British intentions.  These doubts  were 
somewhat dispelled  when  later concessions  were  made but 
these  concessions  were  billed  as  "defeats"  by  the  Labour 
opposition  and much  political  capital  was  made  of them. 
In spite of this  precarious  balancing act it is  likely  that 
had de Gaulle not interfered, Mr. Heath would have arrived 
at  some  mutually  agreeable  arrangements  with  the  Six. 
When  it  became  clear,  however,  that  the  British  were 
determined to join de  Gaulle had either to impose his veto 
or change his  entire concept of Europe and France's place 
in  it.  Prime  Minister  Macmillan  made  the  first  choice 
somewhat  easier  than  it  might  otherwise  have  been  by 
appearing  to "sell out" to Kennedy  at Nassau.  This  act, 
viewed  against the fact  that the  British view  of the  world 
was  closer  to  the  American  than  the  French,  gave 
de  Gaulle's  veto just enough credibility  to suit him.  The 
fact  that France's partners  opposed the  French action  did 
not  unduly  worry  de  Gaulle  since  he  was  confident  that 
they would not sacrifice the Community for Britain. 
From the veto to the 1966 election 
The immediate  British  reaction  to President de  Gaulle's 
veto  was  one  of  shock  and  dismay.  The  Government's 
position was that the veto had made the European question 
a  non-issue  for  the  present  although  its  European  policy 
had  not changed.  The  Labour  opposition  went  to  great 
length  to embarass  the Government and labelled  both the 
negotiations and the veto as  humiliating defeats for Britain. 
The European question  then  went into a  kind  of limbo 
and was  only briefly revived in the 1964 election campaign. 
The victory  of a  Labour Party  opposed  to entry into the 
EEC and preoccupied with domestic problems continued to 
keep  the  issue  in  the  background until early  1965  but the 
worsening economic situation and the fact that Mr. Wilson, 
now  in  power,  must  take  Europe  more  seriously  than  he 
had  previously done,  worked  towards  a  revival  of interest 
in Europe. 
The  1966  elections  saw  the clarification of both political 
party's  positions  although  the  question  by  no  means 
dominated  the  campaign.  The  Conservative  position 
continued  to  be  for  unqualified  entry  while  the  Labour 
Party was  somewhat more ambiguous.  Mr. Wilson  seems 
to have favoured  entry if the right terms could be gained. 
The second and third  British bids 
The  1966  election  returned  the  Labour Party  to power 
with  an  increased  majority  and  Mr.  Wilson  took  the 
opportunity to reorganize his  cabinet, placing in prominent 
positions  several  declared  "Europeans".  When  the  Prime 
Minister announced the Government's declaration of intent 
in the Commons on 10  November,  1966  he knew he could 
carry both his cabinet and the Parliamentary Party.  Those 
ministers  opposed  to,  and those  in  favour  of,  entry were 
about evenly balanced and the presence of a  majority who 
were prepared to follow  Mr. Wilson either way left him in 
a strong position since the increased Parliamentary majority 
meant that, when he came  out for  entry he  could carry a 
majority  in  spite  of  some  opposition  from  the  Labour 
back  benches. 
In  an  attempt  to  accurately  assess  the  British  position 
Mr.  Wilson  undertook  a  tour  to  the  capitals  of  the  six 
Community  members.  The  Prime  Minister  was  well 
received  and  he  made  a  number  of  notable  speeches, especially  one  at the  Council  of Europe, in which  he left 
no doubt that the Labour Government, like its Conservative 
predecessor,  accepted  and  shared  the  enthusiasm  for  a 
united  Europe.  The  European  response  to  Mr.  Wilson's 
tour,  and  the  successful  Parliamentary debate following  it, 
led to a second British attempt at entry in May 1967. 
The  EEC  members  (with  the  significant  exception  of 
France) and the Commission of the European Communities 
all  expressed  their  willingness  to  commence  talks  with 
Britain at the end of 1967  but this second bid, like the first, 
was  frustrated  by  the  intransigence  of  France,  or  more 
accurately,  President de  Gaulle.  This  time  it was,  among 
other  reasons,  the  state  of  the  British  economy  that  the 
General  cited  as  his  reason  for  believing  the  time  for 
British  entry  was  not yet ripe.  The  remaining  five  Com-
munity members  took this  French rejection  of Britain less 
passively than they had previously and they sought alterna-
tive  ways  of  cooperating  with  Britain  and  thereby  mini-
mizing  the effect  of the French position.  Over the central 
issue  of entry, however, little could be done and it seemed 
clear that as long as  General de Gaulle remained President, 
Britain would have to stay outside of the Community. 
Fortunately for Britain, the world of President de Gaulle 
began to crumble in May 1968  and a year later the General 
himself  departed  from  the  international  scene.  The  new 
French Government has abandoned its attempts to forestall 
what appears to  be inevitable and the  1969  resurrection of 
the British application results in talks sta,rting in July 1970. 
Influential opinion in Britain is  solidly in favour of join-
ing  Europe.  In  their  quest for entry  the  political  parties 
have  the  good  offices  of  both  the  influential  and  mass 
media.  Organized  business  is  also  strongly  in  favour  of 
joining although the position of the mass labour movement 
and farm  interests  is  more  ambivalent and public  opinion 
polls  reveal  that  large  segments  of  the  British  people 
expect but do not prefer entry. 
These  doubts  are fed  and encouraged  by  the  organized 
anti-Common Market forces  who remain opposed to entry. 
These  groups  have  recently  united  in  an  effort  to  block 
entry and although they have little chance of changing Gov-
ernment policy  ,they  continue  to  play  on  popular  opinion 
and hope to  have the question  submitted to a  referendum, 
thereby capitalizing on the uncertainty of the  public.  The 
logic behind the publication of the January white paper on 
the costs  of joining Europe is  questionable since, if it was 
4 
an  attempt  to  improve  Britain's  bargaining  position  in 
Brussels, it was done at the price of weakening the Govern-
ment's  domestic  position  and  giving  aid  and  comfort  to 
those  opposed  to entry.  Mr.  Wilson  has  also,  on  one  or 
two  occasions,  not hesitated  to play  partisan  politics  with 
the issue. 
On  balance,  there appears to be every reason to  believe 
that this  British attempt will  be successful.  It seems to be 
accepted  by the major political leaders  that Europe is  too 
important  an  issue  to  be  reduced  to  partisan,  electoral 
politics  and such  damaging statements  as  have  been made 
in the past will not likely  be repeated.  More importantly, 
the French seem not only tolerant but encouraging in their 
attitude towards Britain.  There can be no doubt that much 
tough  bargaining remains  and the  path to Europe will  not 
be  easy  to  traverse.  Dean  Acheson's  1962  remark  that 
Britain  has  lost  an  Empire  and  not  yet  found  a  role  is, 
however, no longer true in 1970; its role is  now unalterably 
fixed in Europe. 
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Britain  and  Europe:  Quotations 
These  quotations,  which exemplify the  evolution  of British  and Continental 
attitudes to the  question  of Britain's role  in  the  process of European  integration 
from 1945 to 1970, are intended as further aids to the study of this problem and as 
a supplement to the article on Britain and Europe.  They were chosen because of 
their  suitability  for  discussion  and  are  not  necessarily  representative  of official 
attitudes or of all the different factions at different times in the different countries. 
It is suggested that pupils debate the Reynaud quotation and that they analise and 
compare the other quotations as follow-up work to a lesson on Britain and Europe. 
1.  Paul  Reynaud,  former French Prime Minister1 
wrote the following letter to the "Listener'' 
"The trouble is,  I  know,  that in England  statesmen 
are pro-European when they belong to the Opposition 
and anti-European when they are in power." 
2. Winston Churchill Conservative Party Annual 
Conference1  Llandudno, October,  1948 
"The first circle for us  is  naturally the British Com-
monwealth  and Empire,  with  all  that  that  comprises. 
Then there is  also the English-speaking world in which 
we,  Canada, and the other British Dominions  play so 
important a part.  And finally there is  United Europe. 
These three majestic ciTcles  are co-existant and if they 
are  linked  together  there  is  no  force  of combination 
which  could  overthrow them  or even challenge  them. 
Now if you think of rthe  three interlinked circles  you 
will see that we are the only country which has a great 
part in every one of them.  We stand, in fact,  at the 
very point of junction, and here in this  Island at the 
centre of the seaways and perhaps of the airways also 
we  have the opportunity of joining them all together." 
3.  Harold  MacMillan  Counci I  of  Europe  Con-
sultative  Assembly/  Strasbourg,  August  16, 
1950  (on  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Com-
munity) 
"One  thing  is  certain  and  we  may  as  well  face  it. 
Our people are not going to hand to any supranational 
authority  the  right  rto  close  down  our  pits  or  steel-
works.  We  will  allow  no  supranational  authority  to 
put large masses of our people out of work in Durham, 
in the Midlands, in South Wales or in Scotland. 
Fearing  the  weakness  of  democracy,  men  have 
often  sought  safety  in  technocrats.  There is  nothing 
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new  in  this.  It is  as  old  as  Plato.  But  frankly  the 
idea is  not attractive  to the British . . .  We have not 
overthmwn  the  divine  right  of  kings  to  fall  down 
before the divine right of experts." 
4.  Sir  Anthony  Eden  Gabriel  Silver  lecture, 
Columbia University1  January 11, 1952 
"You will realize that I am speaking of the frequent 
suggestions  that  the  United  Kingdom  should  join  a 
federation on the continent of Europe.  This is  some-
thing which we  know, in our bones, we cannot do. 
We know that if we  were  to attempt it,  we  should 
relax the springs of our action in the Western  Demo-
cratic  cause  and  in  the Atlantic  association  which  is 
the  expression  of rthat  cause.  For Britain's story  and 
her interests  lie  far  beyond  the  continent  of Europe. 
Our thoughts move across  the  seas  to the many com-
munities in which our people play their part, in every 
corner of the world.  These are our family ties.  That 
is  our life:  without it we should be no more than some 
millions  of people living on an island off  the coast of 
Europe, in which nobody wants to take any particular 
interest." 
5. Edward  Heath Statement made by Mr. Heath, 
then  leader of the  British  negotiating  team at 
the time of the first  British application to join 
the  European  Community,  at  the  meeting  in 
Paris,  October  10,  1961,  between  the  British 
and the six EEC  governments 
"The  British  Government  and  the  British  people 
have  been through a  searching  debate during  the last 
few years on the subject of their relations with Europe. 
The result of the debate has been our present applica-
tion.  It was a  decision arrived at, not on any narrow 
or short-term  grounds,  but as  a  result  of a  thorough 
assessment over a  considerable period of the needs of our country,  of Europe and  of the  Free World  as  a 
whole.  We  recognize it as a  great decision,  a  turning 
point in our history, and we  take it in all seriousness. 
In saying that we  wish to join the EEC, we  mean that 
we  desire  to  become  full,  wholehearted  and  active 
members  of  the  European  Community  in  its  widest 
sense and to go  forward wirth  you in the building of a 
new Europe. 
Faced  with  the  threats  which  we  can  all  see, 
Europe must unite  or perish.  The  United  Kingdom, 
being part of Europe, must not stand aside.  You may 
say that we have been slow to see the logic of :this.  But 
all  who  are  familiar  with  our history  will  understand 
that the  decision  was  not an  easy  one.  We  had to 
weigh  it long ·and caifefully." 
6.  Action  Committee  for  the  United  States of 
Europe Joint declaration of June 26, 1962 
"The  Unity  of  Europe  will  be  strengthened  by 
Britain  joining  the  European  Community  on  equal 
terms  with  the member states under the conditions of 
the  Treaty  of Rome.  Thus  a  union  of  240  million 
inhabitants will  be created.  This union will  enable all 
its  members  to  achieve  a  higher  rate  of  economic 
growth.  The CommonweaHh countries, among others, 
should  benefit  from  this  expansion.  British  member-
ship in the initial stages of a European political union 
wiH  increase the influence of Europe in  world affairs: 
an influence  which  neither England nor our countries 
could exert separately." 
7.  Hugh Gaitskell Labour Party Annual Confer-
ence, October 3,  1962 
"What does federation mean?  It means that powers 
are taken from national governments and handed over 
to federal governments and to federal  parliaments.  It 
means-I repeat it-that if we  go  into this  we  are no 
more than a  S'tate  (as  irt  were)  in the  United States of 
Europe, such as Texas and California. 
We  must  be  clear about this:  it does  mean, if this 
is the idea, the end of Britain as an independent Euro-
pean state.  I  make  no  apology  for  repeating  it.  It 
means  the  end of a  thousand  years  of history.  You 
may say 'Let it end' but, my goodness, it is  a  decision 
that needs a little care and thought.  And it does mean 
the end of the Commonwealth.  How can one  really 
seriously suppose that if the mother country, the centre 
of the Commonwealth, is a province of Europe (which 
is  what federation means) it could continue to exist as 
the mother country of a series of independent nations? 
It is sheer nonsense." 
8.  Harold  MacMillan  "Britain,  the  Common-
wealth and Europe", pamphlet, October 1962 
"We in Britain are Europeans.  That has always been 
true, but it has now become a reality which we cannot 
ignore.  In the  past,  as a  great  maritime  Empire,  we 
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might give  way  to  insular feelings  of superiority  over 
fO!reign  breeds and suspicion of our neighbours across 
the Channel.  For long periods, we were able to main-
tain  a  balance  of power  in  Europe  which  served  us 
well.  Indeed, if we  had not turned away from Europe 
in the Imperial heyday of the late  19th and early 20th 
centuries, it is  even possible  that the slaughter of two 
world  wars  might  have  been  avoided.  Are  we  now 
to isolate ourselves  from  Europe, at a  time  when  our 
own strength is  no longer self-sufficient  and when  the 
leading  European  countries  are  joining  together  to 
build a future of peace and progress, instead of wasting 
themselves  in  war?  .  .  .  By  joining this  vigorous  and 
expanding community and becoming one of its leading 
members,  as  I  am convinced  we  would,  this  country 
would not only gain a new stature in Europe, but also 
increase  its  standing  and influence  in  the  councils  of 
the world.  We would bring to the inward preoccupa-
tions  of a  continental  land  mass  the  outward-looking 
vi1sion  of  a  great  trading  nation  whose  political  and 
economic horizons span the globe." 
9.  A.  J.  P.  Taylor,  historian,  "Encounter", 
December,  1962 
"I am a European.  I am at home in Europe.  Euro-
pean literature is  my literature.  Europe's  past  is  my 
past.  I  understand  European  music,  European  art. 
The other civilisations of the world are foreign  to me. 
I  don't want  to  turn  inwards,  to  be  merely  English. 
But the Europe now offered  to me is  not my Europe. 
I  don't like the people who are running the Europe of 
the Common Market.  I  am against  their  sort in  this 
country.  I  am against them abroad.  I  don't want to 
be  tied  with  one  part of Europe  against  the  !fest.  I 
am  not  prepared  to  renounce  the  Russians  who  are 
as  much  part of Europe  as  we  are.  If any  people 
have put themselves outside Europe by their behaviour, 
it is  the Germans-not the peoples  whom  we  propose 
to  put  out.  I  want  amity  and  cooperation  between 
all peoples,  not teaming up with  one privileged group 
against the  others. 
We  belong  to  the  Commonwealth  as  much  as  we 
belong to  Europe. 
We  set  an  example  to  the  world,  not  to  Europe. 
We have exploited the world in the past.  All the more 
reason  to give  it a  hand now.  I  don't want  to  join 
with  a  few  rich  white  nations  against  the  world  of 
colour  and  poverty.  I  want  to  bring  the  coloured 
peoples  up to  where  we  are,  not to push them down 
harder than before.  Europe  of the Common  Market 
is  a  colour-bar  community  in  economics,  if  not  in 
politics. 
I  can understand why the rich are for the Common 
Mairket.  Cartels  and  monopolies  have  always  been 
their way.  I daresay it will make the rich richer.  The 
Common  Market  is  the  opposite  of  International 
Socialism;  and I  don't see  how any Socialist can sup-
port it." 10.  President de Gaulle Press conference, Paris, 
January 14,  1963 
"Then Great Britain applied  for membership in the 
Common  Market.  It did  so  after refusing  earlier  to 
participate in the community that was  being built, and 
after  then  having  created  a  free  trade area  with  six 
other  states,  and finally-1  can  say  this,  the  negotia-
t£ons  conducted  for  so  long  on  this  subject  can  be 
recalled-after having put some pressure on the Six  in 
order to prevent the application of the Common Mar-
ket  f,rom  really  getting  started.  Britain  thus  in  its 
turn requested membership, but on its  own conditions. 
England  is,  in  effect,  insular,  maritime,  linked 
through  its  trade,  markets  and  food  supply  to  very 
diverse and often very distant countries.  Its activities 
are  essentially  industrial  and  commercial  and  only 
slightly agricultural.  It has, throughout its work, very 
marked and original customs and traditions.  In short, 
the nature, structure and economic context of England 
differ profoundly kom those of the other States of the 
Continent. 
It  must  be  agreed  that  the  entry  first  of  Great 
Britain and  then  that of those  other States  will  com-
pletely  change  the  series  of adjustments,  agreements, 
compensations  and  regulations  already established  be-
tween  the  Six,  because  all  these  States,  like  Britain, 
have  very  important traits  of their  own.  We  would 
then  have  to  envisage  the  construction  of  another 
Common  Market.  Burt  the  11-member,  then  13-mem-
ber  and  then  perhaps  18-member  Common  Market 
that would  be built would,  without any doubt, hardly 
resemble the one the Six  have built. 
It is  foreseeable  that  the  cohesion  of all  its  mem-
bers,  who  would  be  very  numerous and very  diverse, 
would  not  hold  for  long  and  rthat  in  the  end  there 
would  appear  a  colossal  Atlantic  Community  under 
American  dependence  and  leadership  which  would 
soon completely swallow up the European Community." 
11.  Harold Wilson Bristol, March 18, 1966 
"Labour  welcomes  the  growing  improvement  in 
Common Market attitudes. 
The Government's position, as we  have stated again 
and  again,  is  that  we  are  ready  to  join  if  suitable 
safeguards  for  Britain's  interests,  and  our  Common-
wealth  interests,  can  be  negotiated.  But  unlike  the 
Conservative leader, we  shall not proceed on the  basis 
of an unconditional acceptance of whatever terms  are 
offered  us. 
We  are  not  unilateral  economic  disarmers.  So: 
Negotiations?  Yes.  Unconditional  acceptance  of 
whatever terms we are offered?  No." 
12.  Harold  Wilson  Council  of  Europe  Consult-
ative Assembly, Strasbourg, January 231  1967 
"We mean business in a political sense because over 
the next year, the next ten years, the next twenty years, 
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the  unity  of Europe is  going  rto  be  forged,  and  geo-
graphy,  history,  interest  and  sentiment  alike  demand 
that we play our part in forging it-and working it. 
There may be those  who  believe  that to  widen  the 
Community will  be  to weaken it or to dilute its  exist-
ing sense of purpose and its institutions.  Change there 
will  be,  as there has  been throughout these  ten  years. 
For he  who  rejects  change  is  the  architect  of decay. 
The  only  human  institution  which  rejects  progress  is 
the  cemetery.  We  within  Europe  will  play  our  full 
part  in  generating  change,  whatever  that  means  for 
vested interests or for the protectionist-minded, in Brit-
ain or elsewhere.  It will  be not on stagnation but on 
movement,  continual  movement,  that  the  momentum 
created in postwar Europe can continue, indeed accel-
erate.  Widening therefore, based on change, will mean 
not weakening, but strengthening." 
13.  Jean  Monnet  Comments  following  de 
Gaulle
1s  press  conference,  May  1967 
"What a long way we have come since ·the followers 
of  General  de  Gaulle  voted  against  the  European 
T,reaties, and from the time when the London Govern-
ment  considered  the  Common  Market  to  be  an illu-
sion . . .  In what sort of world are we living, if the Six 
have  to  reject,  without  discussion,  the  request  of  a 
great  European  democracy-overwelmingly  confirmed 
by its elected representatives----to  join the Europe now 
being united?" 
14.  The  British  Government  The  Prime  Min-
ister's letter of application 
MR.  PRESIDENT, 
10  Downing  Street 
Whitehall 
May  lOth  1967 
I have the honour, on behalf of her Majesty's Gov-
ernment in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern  Ireland to inform  your  Excellency  that  the 
United Kingdom hereby applies  to  become a  member 
of  the  European  Economic  Community  under  the 
terms  of  Article  237  of  the  treaty  establishing  the 
European Economic Community. 
Please  accept,  Mr.  President,  the  assurance  of my 
highest  consideration. 
HAROLD  WILSON 
H.E.  Monsieur R. van  Elslande, 
Chairman  of the Council of Ministers 
of the European  Economic Community. 
15.  George  Brown,  speaking  as  Foreign  Secre-
tary, Council  of Western European  Union, The 
Hague, July 4, 1967 
"I have been charged by Her Majesty's Government 
in the United Kingdom to  make clear to  the  Member 
Governments  of the Communities the reasons  for our 
application and its consequences as  we  see  them. We  in  Britain  are conscious  that this  is  a  decisive 
moment  in  our  history.  The  issue  will  shape  our 
future for generations to come. 
The  European  Communities  are  developing  on  an 
economic  base.  But  we  in  Britain,  no less  than  the 
present Members of the Communities,  do  not see  the 
issues  only  in  economic  terms.  The  balance  of eco-
nomic  advantage  for  us  is  a  fine  one.  Some  of the 
most decisive considerations for us have been political. 
But, as I  say,  we  are aiming at something far more 
than  material  pmsperity.  We  see  this  leading  to  a 
greater political purpose for Western Europe.  And if 
that  purpose  is  to  be  realised,  Britain  must  share  it. 
We want, as soon as we  can, to develop really effective 
political unity with our fellow West Europeans. 
Fears have been expressed that there would be some 
radical al·terations  in the nature of your Communities 
if we and other European countries were now to enter 
them.  There  will  of  course  be  changes.  But  they 
will  be changes of dimension~a larger Community, a 
more powerful and more influential Europe.  None of 
us  should  have  anything  to  fear  here-for the  whole 
concept of size  is,  as  I  have  explained,  the  essential 
element of that unity we aspire to.  And above all that 
unity requires  a  common purpose and outlook,  and a 
will  to work  together.  We  have  already  given  assur-
ances  about  this,  and  what  I  have  to  say  today  will 
confirm them.  The fundamentals  of the Communities 
will  remain unaffected,  for we  shall be accepting pre-
cisely  the  same  treaty  aims  and  obligations  in  letter 
and  spirit as  yourselves.  We  aim to  create  with  you 
a  unity,  which  will  be  all  the  greater  because  it  will 
be  built  on  the  rich  diversity  of  achievements  and 
characteristics  of European peoples who share a com-
mon purpose and a common resolve for peace. 
This  application  is  therefore  not  just  a  matter  of 
economics and politics.  The history and culture of our 
continent is the birthright of us all.  We have all con-
tributed to it and we  all share in  it.  Our application 
flows  from the historical development of our continent, 
from the sentiments, which, as Europeans, we all share 
and from the idea we all have of the part our continent 
should play in the  world.  Today the European spirit 
flows strongly in the movement towards a greater unity. 
Surely  it  is  in  the  interests  of all  our countries  that 
Britain  should  make  her  full  contribution  to  this 
unity." 
16.  European Commission Opinion on the appli-
cation for membership of the UK,  Ireland, Den-
mark and  Norway,  September,  1967 
"Analysis  of  the  chief  problems  involved  in  the 
extension of the Community reveals that the accession 
of new  members such as  Great Bri1tain,  Ireland,  Den-
mark  and  Norway,  whose  political  and  economic 
structures  and level  of development are very  close  to 
those of the present member states, could both streng-
then  the Community and afford it an opportunity for 
further progress, provided the new members accept the 
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provisions of the Treaties and the decisions taken sub-
sequently-and this  they  have  said  they  are  disposed 
to  do.  Their accession,  although it would bring great 
changes with it, would not then be likely to modify the 
fundamental  objectives  and individual  features  of the 
European Communities or the methods they use. 
It is  the  Commission's  opinion  that,  in  order  to 
dispel  the uncertainty which still attaches in particular 
to  certain  fundamental points,  negotiations  should be 
opened in  the most appropriate forms  with  the  States 
which  have  applied for membership,  in  order to  exa-
mine  in  more detail, as is  indeed necessary,  the  prob-
lems brought out in this document and to see  whether 
arrangements can be made under which the indispens-
able cohesion and dynamism will  be maintained in an 
enlarged Community." 
17.  Queen  Juliana  of the  Netherlands  Speech 
from  the throne, September,  1967 
"Our country wholeheartedly cooperates in the com-
pletion of the Common Market and the building of an 
economically  united  Europe.  However,  the  govern-
ment attaches the greatest importance to the examina-
tion of the  requests  for  membership  of  the  EEC put 
forward  by Great Britain,  Ireland  and  the  Scandina-
vian countries.  A further hindering of their admission, 
which would maintain the division of Western Europe, 
would  cause  deep  concern  to  the  government  and 
would  without  any  doubt  have  serious  repercussions 
on the course of European integration." 
18.  The  Hague Summit From  the Communique 
issued after the meeting of the Heads of State 
and Government of the Six, The Hague, Decem-
ber 2, 1969 
"They reaffirmed their agreement on the principle of 
the  enlargement  of the  Community,  as  provided  by 
Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome. 
In so  far as  the  applicant  states  accept  the  treaties 
and  their  political  finality,  the  decisions  taken  since 
the  entry  into  force  of  the  treaties  and  the  options 
made in the sphere of development, the heads of state 
or government  have  indicated  their  agreement to the 
opening of negotiations between the Community on the 
one hand and the applicant states on the other." 
19.  George  Brown  House  of  Commons,  Febru-
ary 25,  1970 
"To  me  this  is  far  more  political  than  economic. 
For me  it  is  a  question  of how  in  a  changing  world 
Britain retains a power, a capacity, to influence events. 
I make no apology to anyone.  I  will  pay a very high 
economic price in order to have that power politically 
to  influence  our  future  and  the  way  that  the  world 
develops." 8U 
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